We show how to accommodate the traditional Armington assumption to capture the possibility for a country to import imperfect substitutes as well as perfect substitutes for domestically produced goods. When this possibility is incorporated into a modelling framework, then a Common Agricultural Policy ( 
Introduction
The basic provisions of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) include reduction in domestic support, cuts in export subsidies and improvement in market access. It is now well admitted that tariffication of border measures and access provisions in the form of current access and minimum access tariff quotas have only marginally improved the competitiveness of imports into the European Union (EU) over the six-year implementation period of the URAA (e.g., Swinbank, 1999) . The Agenda 2000 reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has given a further advantage to the EU in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) talks of the Millennium Round (MR) on this dossier. By lowering intervention prices on cereals and beef, the Agenda 2000 reform would allow the EU to agree to significant tariff reductions without really challenging the so-called Community preference for these products. If tariff reductions are equal to intervention price cuts, tariffs will remain sufficiently high to still protect EU producers of cereals from imports with the exception of currently imported highquality cereals such as durum wheat, malting barley or high-quality common wheat.
In spite of this, the EU remains highly vulnerable on the market access front because world prices are still substantially lower than domestic prices for a large set of commodities (with the noteworthy exception of common wheat). As a result, many exporters are likely to significantly penetrate the EU market if protection is sufficiently reduced with the result that foreign products will be competitive relative to domestic products. However, most simulation studies concur that a unilateral or multilateral liberalisation policy would not represent a very grave threat to EU farmers. This is particularly the case for analyses based on Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models (Harrison et al., 1995; Frohberg et al., 1990; Burniaux et al., 1990; Martin et al., 1990; Hubbard, 1994) . For example, Harrison et al. find that a complete elimination of the CAP would result in a decrease in EU agricultural output ranging only from -2.2 per cent to -3 per cent according to assumptions made on capital mobility and wage flexibility.
In CGE models, it is typical to assume product differentiation between domestic and traded goods to capture stylised facts such as imperfect transmission of world price changes to domestic prices, incomplete specialisation and two-way trade (e.g., Weyerbrock, 1998) . On the import side, the standard approach consists in specifying a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) import aggregation function between commodities produced abroad and commodities produced domestically. 1 The CES parametric form generates import demand functions with unitary expenditure elasticities which may yield unrealistic terms-of-trade and trade-volume effects when there are significant income effects (Robinson et al., 1992) . 2 Furthermore, if import shares in domestic consumption are initially very small, impacts of a tariff cut scenario on imported volumes, resource movement and welfare are likely to be underestimated (Morkre and Tarr, 1995) .
One immediate solution to this second problem is to maintain the Armington assumption while using elasticities that are rather high by the usual standards (Morkre and Tarr, 1995; Gehlar, 1994; Anderson et al., 1999) . But in the context of a tariff elimination scenario on agricultural imports into the EU, such an approach suffers from two main drawbacks. Firstly, there is the problem of parameter calibration since augmented Armington elasticities cannot be related to econometric work in the literature. As a result, calibration can only be very ad hoc even if Systematic Sensitivity Analyses (SSA) can be used as a partial palliative to this problem (Hertel, 1999) .
Secondly, the traditional Armington approach does not allow CGE (as well as partial) agricultural models to reproduce the fact that non differentiated agricultural imports are likely to penetrate the EU market in a regime where tariff protection is significantly reduced, at the extreme set to zero. In the case of wheat for example, a reduced tariff protection scenario would expose the EU to the prospect of increased imports of high-1 On the export side, the standard approach consists in specifying a Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) function between domestically produced goods for sale on the domestic market and domestically produced goods for sale on the export market. 2 On this point, see also Brown (1987) who argues that the monopoly power implicit in product differentiation is the source of the strong terms-of-trade effects observed in Armington-type models. The remainder of the paper has five sections. Section 2 provides an overview of the CGE model. Section 3 gives a detailed description of the trade specification adopted for cereals. Section 4 describes the reform experiments. Section 5 analyses the results and Section 6 concludes.
Model overview
The structure of the model is outlined in Annex 1. It is a static, agriculture and agrifood focused CGE model of the French economy benchmarked to data for 1990. The two foreign regions, i.e., the Rest of the European Union (RoEU) and the Rest of the World (RoW), are incorporated in a reduced manner as they are simply entered as suppliers of
French imports and demanders of French exports. The model is neoclassical and
Walrasian in spirit, in the tradition of Shoven and Whalley (1984) .
The model identifies nine agricultural industries, six food processing industries, five industries for the rest of the economy and two retailing industries. The nine agricultural industries produce fourteen agricultural products and the six food processing industries produce eleven food products. The industry and product disaggregation of the model is reported in Annex 2. The disaggregation level on the production side is sufficiently detailed to capture the main forward and backward linkages among the various agricultural industries, as well as between the agricultural industries, the food processing industries and the raw material suppliers. The French government is modelled as an explicit, but non-optimising agent. It saves a fixed proportion of its disposable income defined as the sum of rental income from primary factors of production that it owns (i.e., capital and land), income transfers withdrawn from the domestic household and the two foreign zones, tariffs on imports, ad valorem taxes on production and ad valorem taxes on private consumption. It uses this income to save and for subsidy expenditures, transfer payments to the domestic household and the two foreign zones, as well as public consumption in services.
Nominal government demand in services is set exogenously. The French government budget is balanced through transfers to/from the domestic household and the RoEU.
The EAGGF is modelled in a simplified way. It pays all input, output and export subsidies corresponding to CAP expenditures. Its budget is balanced through income transfers from the RoEU. Its working can be illustrated as follows. Let us assume that direct aid payments to French farmers are reduced by a given amount. In that case, transfers from the RoEU to the EAGGF are reduced by the same amount to balance the 4 The degree of imperfect mobility of a primary input is captured by the elasticity of transformation of a CET function. Following Peerlings (1993) , we assume that this parameter equals 0.1 for land, 0.3 for labour and 0.5 for capital. Agricultural trade policies and internal farm programmes are modelled explicitly, including import tariffs, variable export subsidies, input and output subsidies, production quotas, the intervention price mechanism and the mandatory set-aside programme. 
Agricultural policy modelling and trade specification for cereals
The basic elements of the EU legislation applied to cereals include public purchases at minimum intervention prices, export subsidies and protection against imports through tariffs. 6 The internal support mechanism combines price support with direct area payments. Producers of COP crops get the direct aids only if they set aside part of their land. The mandatory set-aside rate is fixed annually and compensation for set aside is paid per hectare.
Intervention mechanism modelling and export specification
The intervention price is a political price set exogenously. It is the delivered to store price at which EU purchases, through national boards, are made. In practice, intervention buying serves to maintain EU market prices at a minimum level in a regime where domestic supply exceeds internal demand. We assume that French cereals that are initially purchased for public storage can be disposed of on the French market, 5 The voluntary set-aside programme is not modelled. 6 Before the URAA, protection was ensured through threshold prices and variable import levies. Under the URAA, the threshold prices were abolished and the import levies were converted into specific duties.
In the case of cereals in the EU, the duty-paid price cannot exceed 155 per cent of the intervention price.
exported to the RoEU market and/or exported to the RoW market through the use of variable export subsidies. The latter are intended to bridge the gap between French and world prices. 7 We assume that domestically produced cereals for sale on the two export markets are perfect substitutes for domestically produced cereals for sale on the French market. This assumption is more realistic than the alternative of imperfect substitutability because the intervention mechanism largely prevents French farmers from differentiating production according to destination markets in a regime of excess supply.
The perfect substitutability assumption implies that the standard CET export aggregation function used for products which are not regulated by the intervention mechanism is here replaced by a simple sum and that equilibrium prices of domestic sales, exports to the RoEU and exports to the RoW are equal, i.e.,
where Y is the domestic production with price P, YD is the domestically produced To accommodate the intervention price regime (P=PI, where PI is the intervention price) and the competitive price regime (P>PI) simultaneously, we use the mixedcomplementarity approach (Rutherford, 1995; Löfgren and Robinson, 1997) by specifying a set of inequalities-equalities:
The price regime is endogenously determined. When export subsidies S are strictly positive, the market price P is equal to the intervention price (equation 3b). The latter is strictly greater than the world export price in French francs (
, where 7 Export subsidies are granted in the light of market situations. As a result, the subsidy can be a tax if world prices are greater than EU prices. Following Weyerbrock (1998), we do not allow for agricultural export taxes because we think that the EU is not able to defend export taxes over an extended period. In practice, we will assume that EU market prices cannot be lower than world prices. 8 To simplify notation, we drop the i subscript corresponding to the type of cereals (1 for common wheat, 2 for barley, 3 for maize and 4 for other cereals). ) and/or when exports to the RoW equal zero.
Import specification: the modified Armington specification
On the import side, consumers demand a composite good which is a CES aggregate of imports from the RoW, imports from the RoEU and commodities produced domestically. Given the first-order conditions, the import demand function from a given foreign zone is defined as a function of the relative price of the composite good to the relevant import price, the elasticity of substitution between the three sources, as well as the shift and share parameters in the CES function. This is the traditional Armington specification adopted here for all tradable commodities including cereals in the two benchmark experiments, i.e., experiments 1 and 2 in Section 4. In experiment 3, this specification is modified for cereals to allow France to import differentiated (i.e., imperfectly substitutable) and undifferentiated (i.e., perfectly substitutable) cereals from the RoW in a scenario where tariff protection on cereals from the RoW is set to zero.
The modified CES import aggregation function is defined by: is the import price of imports from the RoEU.
By rearranging the first-order conditions of the minimisation programme (6), we get:
where PC is the CES price index of the composite good XC, 
The experiments
Table 1 details the three experiments. All assume a removal of internal support measures in force in the sector of cereals as well as of export subsidies on cereal exports to the RoW. 10 In experiment 1, import tariffs on cereal imports from the RoW are maintained at base period levels. In experiments 2 and 3, they are set to zero. In experiments 1 and 2, cereal imports are modelled using the traditional Armington specification. In experiment 3, they are modelled using the modified Armington specification. At this stage, the following remark is in order.
The CGE model used in this paper focuses on France, the RoEU being simply entered as a supplier of French imports and a demander of French exports. As a result, contemplated policy changes can be simulated explicitly only for France. But as we realistically consider that all experiments apply at the EU level (i.e., simultaneously in
France and in the RoEU), impacts of policy changes in the RoEU must also be taken into account. This can be done only in an implicit way through induced effects of policy changes on RoEU import supplies and export demands. In all experiments, impacts of contemplated policy changes in the RoEU are taken into account by assuming that market price adjustments are identical (in percentage terms) in France and in the RoEU.
Such an assumption implies notably that COP market equilibria are defined at the whole EU level. (Table 1 )
The results
We first analyse the consequences of the three experiments for the four cereals distinguished in the model, i.e., common wheat, barley, maize and other cereals (Table   2 ). In a second stage, we examine the impacts of the three experiments on selected variables (Table 3) .
( Table 2 and Table 3 )
Impacts on cereals
Experiment 1 leads to domestic price reductions for the four cereals, the production price of common wheat falling the most (-19 Let us now consider experiments 2 and 3 where import tariffs on cereals from the RoW are removed. Table 2 clearly highlights the crucial role of the method for modelling cereal imports from the RoW.
When retaining the traditional Armington approach, the removal of import tariffs on cereals from the RoW has nearly no effect on domestic cereal markets relative to experiment 1. This is not surprising. Base period cereal imports from the RoW and related levied tariffs are very small. 12 Because the traditional Armington modelling of 11 These outcomes may easily be explained by noting that the fall in own price causes demand to increase, but the fall in prices of substitutable crops causes demand to decrease. In the case of maize and other cereals, the negative cross-price effects offset the positive own-price and expansion effects so that total domestic demand remains nearly unchanged for maize and decreases for other cereals. 12 In the 1990 reference year, French imports of cereals from the RoW were very low. Figures from the French National Accounts indicate that the share of these imports in total domestic demand was 0.36 per cent for common wheat, 0.01 per cent for barley, 5.35 per cent for maize and 1.72 per cent for other cereals. Moreover, related calculated ad valorem tariff equivalents were also very low: 3.03 per cent for common wheat, 0 per cent for barley, 1.54 per cent for maize and 1.61 per cent for other cereals. These figures suggest that cereals imported from the RoW are mainly imperfect substitutes for domestically produced ones, tariffs levied on these imports being much lower than corresponding URAA consolidated tariff equivalents, and these cereals entering the French market because they satisfy specific needs corresponding to demands for high quality cereals.
imports does not allow a flow of perfectly substitutable cereal imports from the RoW to be generated, the French and EU price system remains thus, artificially, isolated from world prices even after tariff protection is removed. Relative to experiment 1, experiment 2 induces only a small reduction in cereal import tariffs initially applied on small quantities.
In contrast, the impact of removing cereal border protection on domestic markets is markedly different when the modified Armington specification is used. In experiment 3, In experiment 3, the French and RoEU price system is no longer isolated from world prices (in reality as well as in the model). Domestic price decreases are thus greater, in absolute value, in this third experiment relative to both experiments 1 and 2. This is particularly the case for the three cereals which experienced relatively limited domestic price declines in experiments 1 and 2, i.e., barley, maize and other cereals. In the case of common wheat, domestic price decreases are almost equal in experiments 1 and 3 (-19.1
per cent and -20.1 per cent, respectively). Domestic production price reductions being more pronounced and more equally distributed among cereals, impacts of experiment 3 on domestic production are also more important and more equally distributed across cereals. With respect to the base, domestic production decreases by -32.9 per cent for common wheat, -34.4 per cent for barley, -33.6 per cent for maize and -39.7 per cent for other cereals.
The effects of experiment 3 on domestic intermediate consumption and total domestic demand are positive. Total domestic demand increases by very large percentages for maize (+23.5 per cent with respect to the base), other cereals (+12.3 per cent) and barley (+8.9 per cent). By contrast, total domestic demand for common wheat increases only by a small percentage (+2.2 per cent). For the four cereals, the augmented domestic demand is essentially satisfied by imports of perfectly substitutable cereals from the RoW. As a result, the four cereals experience very large decreases in domestic sales (-9.8 per cent for common wheat, -21.2 per cent for barley, -25.6 per cent for maize and -31.7 per cent for other cereals). policies can be underestimated when using the traditional Armington approach for modelling imports. In the MR negotiation context, it shows that the crucial necessity for the EU (at least from an internal political point of view) to maintain a "sufficient" import protection will give leverage to other countries to obtain very binding commitments on both the internal support and export competition dossier.
Other impacts on selected variables
1. Single-country, multi-sector, static CGE model applied to France, benchmarked to data for 1990, focused on agricultural and food processing sectors.
2. Two foreign markets: the Rest of the European Union (RoEU) and the Rest of the World (RoW).
3. 22 multi-product activity sectors and 30 products: 9 agricultural sectors and 14 agricultural products, 6 food processing industries and 11 food products, 2 retailing sectors, and 5 mono-product activity sectors for the rest of the economy (for more details, see Annex 2).
4. Multi-stage, multi-product, constant-returns to scale production technologies with substitution between inputs, including intermediate inputs.
5. Imperfect substitution between domestic and foreign commodities on both the import and export side (Armington assumption), except for some "regulated" products (see text).
6. Small country assumption on both the import and export side with respect to the RoW, except for some agricultural and food products (cereals and dairy products); large country assumption on both the import and export side with respect to the RoEU for all products.
7. Four primary production factors: labour, capital, land and production rights (i.e., production quotas).
8. Imperfect mobility of primary production factors across activity sectors on the basis of nested CET functions. 11. Explicit modelling of public policy instruments with special attention given to CAP instruments: intervention price mechanism, export subsidies, import tariffs, production quotas, direct payments, set aside, ...
12.
Competitive markets and neoclassical macro-economic closure. 
